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1. Introduction 
J.M. Coetzee, in his talk ‘The Novel Today’, delivered in 1987 at the Weekly Mail 
Book Week, declared,   
In times of intense ideological pressure like the present, when the space in which 
the novel and history normally coexist like two cows on the same pasture, each 
minding its own business, is squeezed to almost nothing, the novel, it seems to 
me, has only two options: supplementarity or rivalry. (Quoted in Attwell 1990: 
286) 
 
He stressed that supplementarity would require the novel to provide the reader 
“with vicarious first-hand experience of living in a certain historical time, 
embodying contending forces in contending characters and filling our experience 
with a certain density of observation” (Quoted in Atwell 1990: 286). Rivalry, on the 
other hand, which is the paradigm he associates with his own novelistic praxis,  
_____________ 
 
1  Department of English, University of Delhi (India) 
 E-mail: nupur9189@gmail.com 
90 Mittal, N. Complut. j. Engl. stud. 24 (2016): 89-101 
would lead to a novel that operates in terms of its own procedures and issues in 
its own conclusions, not one that operates in terms of the procedures of history 
and eventuates in conclusions that are checkable by history (as a child's 
schoolwork is checked by a schoolmistress). In particular I mean a novel that 
evolves its own paradigms and myths, in the process (and here is the point at 
which true rivalry, even enmity, perhaps enters the picture) perhaps going so far 
as to show up the mythic status of history … for example, a novel that is 
prepared to work itself out outside the terms of class conflict, race conflict, 
gender conflict or any of the other oppositions out of which history and the 
historical disciplines erect themselves. (Quoted in Atwell 1990: 286) 
This paper will argue that Coetzee’s work is not impervious to—or deliberately 
non-cognizant of—historical experience. In fact, he posits novelistic discourse as 
an alternative form of discursive engagement with history, rivalling modern 
historical discourse. This paper will focus on two of Coetzee’s post-apartheid 
novels, Disgrace (2000) and Elizabeth Costello (2003), and will examine their 
representation and understanding of historical experience, as well as their 
methodologies for encoding the same in the form of novelistic discourse. 
2. Disgrace
The plot of Coetzee’s novel Disgrace unfolds in actual places in South Africa—
Cape Town, Grahamstown, Salem and George; and depicts a clearly identifiable 
historical milieu—the post-apartheid period of the late nineties. The narrative is 
wholly focalized through the consciousness of the white, middle aged Professor of 
literature, David Lurie, who lives with a sense of being out-of-place “these days” 
(Disgrace 2000: 3), which have been marked by unprecedented social flux ever 
since the abolition of apartheid. A department secretary, who he takes out for 
lunch, notes,  
I mean, whatever the rights and wrongs of the situation, at least you knew where 
you were…Now people just pick and choose which laws they want to obey. It’s 
anarchy. (Disgrace 2000: 8)  
And then again, soon after, there is a more direct reference as Lurie sits watching a 
play in which his “inamorata” (Disgrace 2000: 189), Melanie, is acting:  
Sunset at the Globe Salon is the name of the play they are rehearsing: a comedy 
of the new South Africa set in a hairdressing salon in Hillbrow, Johannesburg. 
On stage a hairdresser, flamboyantly gay, attends to two clients, one black, one 
white…catharsis seems to be the presiding principle: all the coarse old 
prejudices brought into the light of day and washed away in gales of laughter. 
(Disgrace 2000: 23) 
Lurie’s ironic description betrays his view that the historically conditioned 
practices of social organization and of relating to others in society cannot be 
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wished away by mere policy change or wishful thinking. Indeed, this view is 
reinforced when Lurie is attacked and his daughter Lucy is raped, in the latter’s 
country farm, by three black men who are not personally acquainted with them, in 
a case of, what appears to be, racial violence. 
Lucy tells Lurie later that,  
It was so personal…it was done with such personal hatred. That was what 
stunned me more than anything. The rest was […] expected. But why did they 
hate me so? I had never set eyes on them. (Disgrace 2000: 156) 
 
Lurie responds, “It was history speaking through them…a history of wrong….It 
may have seemed personal, but it wasn’t. It came down from the ancestors” 
(Disgrace 2000: 156). However, Lurie is not entirely correct. Those men were 
strangers, indeed, but their act was personal, as Lucy claimed. History constitutes 
the personal. Lurie’s statement—“It was history speaking through them”—in 
reference to the three black men, is significant here. When it is read together along 
with his other remarks it appears to be an innocent figure of speech employed by a 
highly erudite man to convey his point. However, it is imperative to bear in mind 
the fact that the author, J. M. Coetzee, a linguist by training, often employs 
descriptions of acts of articulation in language as metaphors for the manner in 
which cultural sign systems mark and order individual and collective experience in 
a given socio-historical milieu. Lurie’s figure of speech actually ironizes the rest of 
his statement, and it also provides a hint about Coetzee’s conception of history. It 
is possible to explain the author’s understanding of history by taking recourse to 
some of the concepts elaborated in linguist Ferdinand Saussure’s A Course in 
General Linguistics.2 Saussure asserts that sign systems do not just order, and 
reflect reality—they construct reality. He claims,  
Psychologically our thought—apart from its expression in words—is only a 
shapeless and indistinct mass […] without the help of signs we would be unable 
to make a clear-cut, consistent distinction between two ideas. Without language, 
thought is a vague, uncharted nebula. There are no pre-existing ideas, and 
nothing is distinct before the appearance of language. (Quoted in Kirby 1997: 
17) 
 
Sign systems create the reality (effect) they describe.3 It must be emphasized that 
reality (effect) is in no way inferior to prelinguistic reality. As Saussure points out,  
_____________ 
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between language and ideology.   
3  According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the term effect has several meanings. Used as a verb, the term 
effect has one meaning: “Cause (something) to happen; bring about.” In this essay the term reality is not used 
92 Mittal, N. Complut. j. Engl. stud. 24 (2016): 89-101 
To say that language is a product of social forces does not suffice to show 
clearly that it is unfree; remembering that it is always the heritage of the 
preceding period, we must add that these social forces are linked with time. 
Language is checked not only by the weight of the collectivity but also by time. 
These two are inseparable. (Quoted in Kirby 1997: 31) 
 
Therefore, an individual’s perception, thought, utterance or action is never free or 
“personal”, but is generated and delimited by a frame-of-reference constructed by 
socio-historically constituted sign systems. So coming back to Disgrace, we may 
posit that history does “speak” through the black men, because the sign systems 
which generate and delimit the possibilities for their perceptions, thoughts and 
actions are historically conditioned. Centuries of social and political organization 
on the basis of colour has converted race into an important sign for marking 
individuality. The three rapists identify themselves as black men and, accordingly, 
identify Lucy as a white woman and judge her on the basis of a set of expectations 
that constitute the concept of whiteness. Before elaborating on this argument 
further, it would be fruitful to examine another exchange between Lurie and Lucy. 
When Lucy decides not to report to the police that she was raped, Lurie fails to 
understand her reason for doing so. She explains it as an attempt to “save my skin” 
(Disgrace 2000: 112). Lurie warns her that the rapists, wreaking vengeance, will 
not be deterred from attacking again by her decision not to lodge a complaint. But 
Lucy argues that that is not her reason for restraining herself. Lurie probes further, 
“Is it some sort of private salvation you are trying to work out? Do you hope to 
expiate the crimes of the past by suffering in the present?” (Disgrace 2000: 112) 
Lucy replies, “No. You keep misreading me. Guilt and salvation are abstractions. I 
don’t act in terms of abstractions” (Disgrace 2000: 112). Lurie, just like the black 
men, attempts to “read” Lucy in terms of her racial identity. Even if he professedly 
condemns racial discrimination and violence, and feels that racial discrimination 
and discord must be countered and phased out, he treats race as an ontological 
marker of identity. The use of the term “misreading” is telling. Lucy, for Lurie and 
for the rapists, operates as a sign—she is conceptualized (signified) and described 
(signifier) as a white woman.4 They all read Lucy in terms of a sign system which 
exists prior to encounter. The problem is not that they read her as a sign—after all, 
we figure forth and describe ourselves, others, reality (effect) at large in terms of 
signs. The problem is that the rapists and Lurie conflate the sign—a constituent of 
reality (effect)—with the whole of reality.  
 
_____________ 
 
as a standalone term, because the author of this paper believes that there is no essential, irreducible version of 
reality. The term reality (effect) is employed in the paper to describe reality as it is experienced by us because 
of the constant framing of our experiences of pre-linguistic reality by multiple sign systems. The label 
‘Prelinguistic reality’ is employed to refer to material objects as they exist prior to experience.  
4  According to Saussure, a Sign has two components: Signified (concept) and Signifier (which denotes the 
Signified). The Signified, it is necessary to remember, is not equivalent to pre-linguistic reality.   
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3. Elizabeth Costello: Figurations of Modernity and Humanity 
While in Disgrace J.M. Coetzee invokes the experience of living in a post-
Apartheid South African society where the historical legacy of racial oppression 
and discrimination is so deeply ingrained that racial signification remains a 
primary category of marking identities, in another novel, Elizabeth Costello, the 
author invokes human experience in a postcolonial5 world which is marked by an 
asymmetrical global order of political, economic, social and specie-al 
interrelationships on account of discourses which emerged with the unfolding of 
modernity. Elizabeth Costello is a compilation of six lectures delivered by Coetzee 
at different occasions, spanning from 1997 to 2003, under the description of 
‘lessons’ to which are added two new ‘lessons’ and a fictional letter written by 
Lady Chandos to Francis Bacon. Costello, the protagonist, is an Australian novelist 
who is not embedded in the political, social, cultural matrix of any particular 
community, and who is constantly on the move, travelling around the world and 
delivering lectures. She identifies herself as “an ex-colonial”6—which highlights 
the fact that she has descended from white settlers in Australia. But more 
significantly, a perusal of her lectures, and an evaluation of the matrix of concerns 
they flag, would indicate that the given label is an identification of herself as an 
inhabitant of a postcolonial world.7 
Costello, in Lessons Three and Four, delivers lectures entitled “The Lives of 
Animals” in Appleton University. A careful examination of the text of the lectures 
would reveal that they are not just about animals. Instead, they invoke a larger sign 
system, where the meaning of the sign, ‘Animal’, is not simply predicated on the 
union of a set of characteristics which formulate the concept indicated by the 
signifier ‘animal’. Let us take a brief theoretical detour to understand the 
ideological freight marking Costello’s idea of animals. The meaning of the sign, 
‘Animal’, is based on its difference from the sign ‘Human’. Again, we must bear in 
mind that this sign system, which has emerged as the dominant conceptual 
framework over time, does not draw on irreducible ontological reality. It was 
engendered at a (contingent) historical moment when western culture encountered 
different cultures around the world, and in order to attain supremacy and impose its 
practices and discourses globally, it sought to efface difference by defining the 
ideal category of the ‘Human’. Individuals were identified and judged not on the 
basis of their belonging to cultural groups with different rationalities but on the 
basis of their proximity to or distance from the ideal human characteristics 
inscribed within the western cultural discourse. The differences were explained 
away by employing temporal classification—those who exhibited characteristics 
which modern western civilization posited as ideal human attributes, like rational 
thinking—were labelled ‘Modern’, while those who exhibited a predilection for 
alternate rationalities, practices and belief systems, were classed as ‘Backward’ or 
_____________ 
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6  Coetzee, J.M. Elizabeth Costello. London: Vintage, 2003. Pg. 102. 
7  Coetzee had once observed that we are postcolonial- postcolonizer(s) or postcolonized(s).  
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‘Primitive’. All these labels, we may note, are relative categories, which have no 
meaning outside of the temporal-conceptual structure which colonial modernity is 
premised on.8 It was widely supposed that while the modern individual was 
contemporary to modern times, the primitive was (belatedly) evolving towards 
developing those modern, rational attributes and societal structures, which were the 
end goal of human evolution, and which, significantly, marked humans as distinct 
from all the other animals with whom they shared the attribute of embodiment. 
Costello states that it appears to her, that not only is Reason not the being of 
universe but is “the being of human thought” (Elizabeth Costello 2003: 69). Then, 
going a step further, she adds that it is “worse than that, the being of one tendency 
in human thought.” She draws an analogy between intra-specie and inter-specie 
hierarchization, when she recounts that Kafka’s ape Red Peter was considered to 
be a dumb, unthinking animal, until he was trained to speak a (Western) human 
language, German, and to employ reason. She argues that this homogenizing 
impulse may also be traced in the case of the Indian Mathematician Srinivasa 
Ramanujan, who was “captured and transported to Cambridge, England” 
(Elizabeth Costello 2003: 68), where what were dismissed as Ramanujan’s 
“speculative” (Elizabeth Costello 2003: 68) mathematical thoughts, were studied 
and decoded by English academicians, adapting them to the methods of reason 
and, supposedly, thereby rendering them intelligible and intelligent. Costello hints 
at the connection between rationality and capitalistic imperialism when she states 
that we should view the worldwide emergence of rationalist codes of thinking and 
relating to the world not as  
the flowering of a faculty that allows access to the secrets of the universe (but 
as) the specialism of a rather narrow self-regenerating intellectual tradition 
whose forte is reasoning, in the same way that the forte as chess players is 
playing chess, which, for its own motives it tries to install at the centre of the 
world. (Elizabeth Costello 2003: 68. Emphasis mine) 
 
The attempt to install goal-directed, inductive reason “at the centre of the 
world” is marked by the motive to align belief systems and practices, world over, 
with money rationality and capitalistic practices. Modern cultural groups argued 
that backward or primitive people were incapable of ruling themselves on account 
of not being modern—because of this they were not aware of the goals that a 
society should set for itself and of the orderly, efficient structures it should employ 
to order itself so as to keep developing. Only modern people, armed with reason 
and a historical imagination, could foresee which stage of historical development 
they were at and the ground they had to cover. Modern western powers justified 
their conquering of non-western societies by arguing that the latter needed their 
_____________ 
 
8  Banerjee, Prathama. “Introduction.” Politics of Time: ‘Primitives’ and History- Writing in a Colonial Society. 
New Delhi: Oxford, 2006. The idea of temporality in Western culture is couched in a way so as to subsume 
the entirety of the constellation of human cultures to its own logic. Therefore, Modernity is, to borrow 
Prathama Banerjee’s term- “always already Colonial Modernity.” 
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intervention in order to shape and regulate societal organization so as to bring 
about modernity. Eurocentric, normative modernity was established as the standard 
of measurement of a people’s development, and was deployed to evaluate and 
judge actions, determine which did and did not accord with its principles (which 
were, of course, those that were commensurate with money rationality and 
capitalistic practices). So the pre-given category of western reason served as a 
framework to generate, organize and evaluate activities, and in this manner, 
alternative, different ideas and practices were labelled as irrational and non-
modern, losing their ability to generate alternative, contesting forms of social 
organization, behaviour and identification. Costello, in her lectures, notes how 
modern pedagogical practices play a significant role in regulating future action and 
thinking in society, and in inoculating it against difference and contingence. The 
training which was provided to Red Peter so as to help him develop a reasoning 
faculty and skill, and the training which Ramanujan lacked, so that his speculations 
had to be suitably adapted by rational academicians in order to render them useful 
and reasonable—that training has assumed the form of the dominant pedagogical 
methodology in contemporary times which involves  
the designated twelve years of schooling and six years of tertiary education….(to 
equip one for) making a contribution to the decoding of the great book of Nature 
via Physical and mathematical disciplines. (Elizabeth Costello 2003: 69)  
 
Compare this to Lurie’s ruminations in the first half of Disgrace about an aspect of 
South African Society of the nineties—“the Great Rationalization” (Disgrace 
2000: 3) or the standardization of pedagogical and economic practices to align 
them with the global capitalist structures. At the outset of the novel, we learn that 
the University where he works has been restructured according to the new South 
African education policy which is in step with the global move to make 
educational more functional, and thereby align it with the capitalist outlook so that 
it could train people to contribute to capitalist activities. For instance, Lurie is 
described thus:   
Once a professor of modern languages, he has been, since classics and Modern 
languages were closed down as part of the great rationalization, adjunct 
professor of communications…He has never been much of a teacher; in this 
transformed and, to his mind, emasculated institution of learning he is more out 
of place than ever. But then, so are other of his colleagues from the old days, 
burdened with upbringings inappropriate to the tasks they are set to perform; 
clerks in a post- religious age. (Disgrace 2000: 4) 
4. The Effect(s) of Realism 
Coetzee encodes his conception of historical reality in the Ur-Realist form of the 
given novels. Since historical reality, according to him, is a nebula—and it is 
accessible to us only partially in the form of premeditated sign systems which 
96 Mittal, N. Complut. j. Engl. stud. 24 (2016): 89-101 
generate and delimit the possibilities of thoughts, utterances and actions—no genre 
can reflect pre-linguistic historical reality. Therefore, while figuring forth his 
stories in the realist form, he underlines the limitations which mark the discursive 
boundaries of the form. Before illustrating this argument it is necessary to 
recapitulate the tenets of the realism which emerged as the dominant literary mode 
of novelistic practice in the twentieth century. Critics distinguish it from 
established literary traditions by drawing attention to its “formlessness” and use of 
non-embellished language (Watt 1957: 9). György Lukács, an influential theorist 
of the novel whose thoughts Coetzee often commented on, states that in a realist 
text the plot is driven by a dialectical interaction between the individual personality 
traits of the characters and their material socio- economic realities. It is also shaped 
by the interrelationships and interactions of characters which are reflective of 
social interrelationships which in turn depend upon the historic stage which the 
material, economic base structure of the society is at. The final social vision of the 
text manages to surpass authorial intention and foresight, because the author 
grounds the characters, ideas and phenomenon that he includes, in the “objective” 
material realities which he observes (Lukács 2006: 380-393). In Doubling the 
point: Essays and Interviews, J.M. Coetzee states,  
I happen to think Lukács’ judgement wrong, conditioned by more than a little 
moralistic prejudice…the general position that Lukács takes on what he calls 
realism, as against modernist decadence carries a great deal of power, political 
and moral, in South Africa today: one’s first duty as a writer is to represent 
social and historical processes; drawing the procedures of representation into 
question is time wasting, and so forth. (Coetzee 1992: 202. Emphasis mine) 
According to him texts create the historical reality (effect) that they represent. 
Coetzee’s novels, therefore, in a bid to be Realist to the core, underline the manner 
in which they create the reality (effect) which they reflect. 
When Lukács claims that realism reflects material realities, he ignores the fact 
that the author is engendered by a specific historical and social context where the 
sign systems available to him mould the perception of the Reality (effect) that his 
works ‘reflect’. In Disgrace, as was argued earlier in the paper, it is on account of 
reading Lucy in terms of her material, social identity—a white woman—in a given 
historical period (postcolonial/apartheid) that the rapists and Lurie all perform a 
“misreading” of her. Moreover, the author never provides an insight into Lucy’s 
motives, since the narrative is entirely focalized through Lurie’s consciousness. By 
aligning the reader’s and the narrative’s consciousness with that of Lurie’s, the 
author hints that while he’s able to underline the discursive nature of historical 
reality (effect), he’s unable to step outside it in order to conceive of subject 
positions which are not generated and delimited by the reality (effect) he perceives 
and represents, because the subject positions available to him—as well as the sign 
systems available to him for perceiving and representing that reality (effect)—are 
conditioned by it.  
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Similarly, in Elizabeth Costello, while Costello recognizes the constructedness 
of the idea of man, and of the distinction between man and the animal, and she 
stresses that we—all the humans—share with animals the condition of being 
embodied, she is unable to live the embodied existence. Throughout the novel, 
irrespective of what she says in her lectures, she continues to be gripped by notions 
predicated on disembodied ideas of the human. For instance, in the first lecture, 
she discusses her wish to become immortal through her work. She recognizes the 
futility of her desire—acknowledging that everything dies out in the end—but is 
unable to let go of it. She doesn’t, in her reflections on immortal fame, consider the 
fact that this wish is predicated on an unquestioning acceptance of the modern 
mind-body split wherein an individual is able to think of an identity outside of the 
body. Moreover, in her lecture, while indicating that we must think in embodied 
terms in order to be able to, through the act of sympathetic imagination, imagine 
the subject position of animals and thus understand the limits of our own subject 
position, she doesn’t outline in concrete terms how one may go about doing such a 
thing. She gives only vague hints such as the injunction: “I was hoping not to have 
to enunciate principles  […]  open your heart and listen to what your heart says.” 
(Elizabeth Costello 2003: 82). In a debate about animal consciousness with a 
Professor of Philosophy, Costello advocates “kindness”, which she defines “in its 
full sense, as an acceptance that we are all of one kind, one nature” (Elizabeth 
Costello 2003: 106). When O’Hearne argues against the possibility of the same, 
stating that animals’ intelligence is deficient when compared to humans’, she 
refuses to respond, stating that one “would first want to interrogate the whole 
question of rights and how we come to possess them” (Elizabeth Costello 2003: 
107), indicating that the very definition of human intelligence and rationality is 
strategic in nature. She argues against the points he raises, but is unable to posit her 
own conception of human “kindness” with/for animals. The problem is that she is 
formulating her utterance in a format which requires assertive, rational statements 
imbued with logic. However, what she is trying to say is seemingly situated in a 
realm of thought which is not contiguous with the genre of the rational debate 
format, as it is not based on material evidence and isn’t formulated through rational 
logic. She ends the debate with the statement— 
If the last common ground that I have with him is reason, and if reason is what 
sets me apart from the veal calf, then thank you but no thank you, I’ll talk to 
someone else. (Elizabeth Costello 2003: 112) 
Ironically, this statement too is a typical if-then logic statement. Since she is 
herself a product of the culture whose seams she senses, she’s unable to articulate 
her critique of the same except in terms of negation. It is necessary to remember 
that the lessons in the novel were originally lectures in the fictional mode, which 
were delivered by Coetzee on different occasions. Coetzee allows different—and 
often even divergent—positions and ideas to be voiced or bodied forth by different 
characters. Ultimately, however, it is possible to identify the irreducible base 
which enables/ limits all the characters’ utterances. And that irreducible base is the 
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historical reality (effect). And since Coetzee focalizes his narratives entirely 
through one of his characters and doesn’t offer any alternative and/or ironical 
viewpoint, he archly indicates that the given ‘irreducible base’ of the historical 
reality (effect) of his milieu determines his own thoughts, utterances and 
representations as well.  
5. Living with Unknowability 
The irreducible base of the postcolonial, modern cultural milieu appears to be the 
inability to remain uncertain, giving rise to the need to ground all observations and 
exchanges in pre-given codes and/ or in material, empirical evidence. This paper 
does not seek to suggest that non-modern cultures are capable of accessing reality 
prior to meditation. As suggested earlier in the paper, an(y) individual is able to 
perceive differentiated reality only through linguistic sign systems. However, what 
distinguishes modern culture from others is its need to contain difference and 
otherness. Johannes Fabian in his essay, ‘The Other revisited’ argues that ‘the 
Other’ is a vital epistemic category, the consciousness of which inspires the human 
need to communicate and express. He states that,  
Recognizing an other = alius as other = alter is a condition of communication 
and interaction, hence of participating in social-cultural practices (or whatever 
sociological categories, from group to society, apply); or of sharing a 
Lebenswelt. Without alterity no culture, no Lebenswelt […] this concept makes 
sense only if Lebenswelt exists in the plural. (Fabian 2006: 9) 
 
Fabian outlines two kinds of ‘Others’ in the given essay. First, the Other within, 
whose alterity is constitutive of a given cultural universe. Second, the Other 
without—who is recognized as a member of a different cultural universe. As was 
noted earlier in the paper, on account of its need to establish and sustain cultural 
supremacy over people belonging to non-western cultural groups, the relation that 
the modern culture establishes with the non-modern is consistent with the first 
definition of Othering that Fabian proposes. It is on account of its need to erase the 
possibility of occurrence of practices which are contrary to its own rationality and 
regulations, that modern culture is wary of radical Otherness and contingence, and 
it seeks to contain the same by ordering experience in terms of pre-meditated 
systems of ideas or by explaining/grounding analysis of experience in terms of 
what it identifies as material, empirical evidence. Coetzee underlines this approach 
in his ruminations on realism in Elizabeth Costello.  
Elizabeth Costello begins with a “lesson” entitled “Realism”, with a direct 
address from the author J.M. Coetzee to the reader, thereby dispelling the realist 
illusion, in order to draw attention to the implicit assumptions about the realist 
narrative which are shared by the author and the readers, and whose acceptance 
allows the illusion to be sustained. This serves to draw attention to and subvert the 
assumptions that realism as a literary mode is best suited to represent reality on 
account of its “formlessness” (Hale 2006: 9) and the proximity of its language to 
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the language of daily reality. The first chapter is peppered by authorial 
interventions which indicate that scenes have been skipped or that “the scene has 
changed” (Elizabeth Costello 2003: 4) and so on. In one of his interventions, he 
states that,  
Realism has never been comfortable with ideas. It could not be otherwise: 
realism is premised on the idea that ideas have no autonomous existence...when 
it needs to debate ideas, as here, realism is driven to invent situations—walks in 
the countryside, conversations—in which characters give voice to contending 
ideas and thereby in a certain sense embody them. The notion of embodying 
turns out to be pivotal. In such debates ideas do not and indeed cannot float free: 
they are tied to the speakers by whom they are enounced, and generated from the 
matrix of individual interests out of which their speakers act in the world. 
(Elizabeth Costello 2003: 9)  
 
The italicised statement deconstructs conventional realist practices’ apprehension 
and representation of reality. Realism is uncomfortable with free floating ideas, but 
its need to ground its ideas in a material basis is itself “premised on the idea that 
ideas have no autonomous existence.” This draws attention to a fact which has 
been reiterated again and again in this paper, that empirical experience and 
observation, which is privileged by science and literary realism like, is never 
unmediated. What is perceived as ‘material’ is actually a construction of reality 
(effect) by a historically sanctioned sign system. Coetzee’s views bear a family 
resemblance with those of Frederick Jameson in The Political Unconscious where, 
eloquently, the latter notes that realism constructs  
the newly quantifiable space of extension and market equivalence, the new 
rhythms of measurable time, the new secular and “disenchanted” object world of 
the commodity system, with its post-traditional daily life and its bewilderingly 
empirical, “meaningless,” and contingent Umwelt—of which this new narrative 
discourse will then claim to be the “realistic” reflection. (Jameson 1981: 42) 
 
The limits of the culture that generates realism and defines what constitutes the 
‘material’ reality (effect), are evident in the idiom that Lurie and Costello both 
employ to articulate their apprehensions of experiences which it provides no 
conceptual terms to define. Lurie, after having lost and/or given up everything that 
defined him—his job, his responsibilities and rights as a father, his house, his faith 
in a world where individuals’, and later, creatures’ singularity/uniqueness was 
appreciated—realizes that all those defining, differentiating categories are 
immaterial. He comes to that realization when he sees dogs being euthanized in 
Bev’s clinic. Earlier, Lurie used to incinerate dogs’ corpses himself in the public 
crematorium when he saw that the workers used to beat the corpses with shovels to 
bend them in shape so they could enter the furnace. He reasoned to himself, then, 
that he did it “For his idea of the world, a world in which men do not use shovels 
to beat corpses into a more convenient shape for processing” (Disgrace 2000: 146). 
He, at that point, held on to the notion of the integrity of the Self, of the singularity 
and definitiveness/difference of each creature. But by the end of the novel, he 
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begins to focus on helping the creatures in death rather than after it, easing their 
passage out of life. He recognizes that integrity of the self lies not in difference but 
in sameness—of the flesh, the embodied existence that all living creatures share. 
However, he is unable to articulate this sense in words free of the mind/soul and 
body duality which is at the heart of modern discourse. Using quasi theological 
language, he reflects that, “here the soul is yanked out of the body; briefly it hangs 
about in the air, twisting and contorting; then it is sucked away and is gone...one 
leaks out of existence” (Disgrace 2000: 219). His use of theological discourse is 
significant. Religious experience and parlance, in the modern world, does not 
constitute ‘materiality’ as it is not empirically verifiable. Thus he bodies forth his 
apprehension of the limits of historical reality (effect) by employing idiom that has 
been banished from its ambit, but which still bears traces of thought structures, 
such as the body-mind duality, which characterize it. Most significantly, it 
underlines the fact that the very moment of an ongoing act of experiencing, 
constitutes an act of ‘faith’, because our immediate reception of information from 
the senses is populated by phenomena which are differentiated by the sign systems 
we have inherited/inherit and created/create through consensus.    
J.M Coetzee’s novels represent historical experience by focalizing it through the 
consciousnesses of different characters and by grounding the different and often 
diverging utterances in the seemingly irreducible perceptions/assumptions about 
historical, social reality that they seem to share. Moreover, they underline the 
limits of the boundaries of those ‘seemingly irreducible perceptions/assumptions 
about historical, social reality’ and, thus, denaturalize them—not by negating them 
and erecting alternative definitions of the irreducible, but—by highlighting the fact 
that every representation of historical reality (effect) also constructs it, and that, 
therefore, ontological (pre-linguistic) historical reality always already exceeds 
historical discourse.  
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